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Simply consistent constructive systems of first order Peano’s 
Arithmetic that do not yield undecidable propositions by 
Gödel’s reasoning 
In this paper, we consider significant alternative systems of first order predicate 
calculus. We consider systems where the meta-assertion “PA proves: F(x)” 
translates under interpretation as “F(x) is satisfied for all values of x, in the domain 
of the interpretation, that can be formally represented in PA”, whilst “PA proves: 
(Ax)F(x)” interprets as “F(x) is satisfied by all values of x in the domain of the 
interpretation”. 
We are thus able to argue that formal systems of first order Arithmetic that admit 
Gödelian undecidable propositions validly are abnormally non-constructive.  
We argue that, in such systems, the strong representation of primitive recursive 
predicates admits abnormally non-constructive, Platonistic, elements into the formal 
system that are not reflected in the predicates which they are intended to formalise.  
We argue that the source of such abnormal Platonistic elements in these systems is 
the non-constructive Generalisation rule of inference of first order logic.  
We argue that, in most simply consistent systems that faithfully formalise intuitive 
Arithmetic, we cannot infer from Gödel’s reasoning the Platonistic existence of 
abnormally non-constructive propositions that are formally undecidable, but true 
under interpretation. 
We define a constructive formal system of Peano’s Arithmetic, omega2-PA, whose 
axioms are identical to the axioms of standard Peano’s Arithmetic PA, but lead to 
significantly different logical consequences. 
We thus argue that the formal undecidability of true Arithmetical propositions is a 
characteristic not of relations that are Platonistically inherent in any Arithmetic of 
the natural numbers, but of the particular formalisation chosen to represent them. 
We finally argue that Gödel’s reasoning essentially formalises the Liar sentence in 
standard PA by means of a “palimpsest”. 
Chapter 1.  First order Arithmetic is not omega-constructive 
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1.0.  Introduction 
We take as our primary reference Mendelson’s first order exposition of the essentially 
second order formal system and various revolutionary concepts introduced by Gödel in 
his original paper “On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and 
related systems I”.  
We also borrow some content, and style of presentation, from Karlis Podnieks’ proof 
of Goedel’s incompleteness theorem in his e-textbook “Around Goedel’s Theorem”.1 
We take as our starting point the systems of first order predicate calculus and first order 
Arithmetic defined by Mendelson (p57 & p102).  
We introduce the concept of omega-constructivity, and show that standard first order 
Arithmetic PA is not omega-constructive.  
                                               
1  Where possible, words and phrases have been hyper-linked to references, with detailed 
locations or further hyperlinks to the Internet, for consistency in definitions and 
meanings, or for expanding on their possible meanings-in-usage in a wider context.  
 
Pointing your cursor at a word or phrase will indicate if the word or phrase has been 
hyper-linked to another reference (the cursor should change shape in most browsers).  
 
Clicking once (default used whilst composing this paper) will bring up the cross-linked 
reference on the screen.  
 
Use the ‘Back’ button ‘<=’ on the browser toolbar at the top of the screen (not any of the 
‘? ’ buttons in the document) to return to the original hyper-linked word or phrase in the 
text. 
 
1.1.  Introducing omega-constructivity : omega-PA 
We say that a simply consistent formal system of standard first order Arithmetic PA is 
omega-constructive if and only if it is not the case that, for any well-formed formula 
F(x1, x2, x3, ... , xn) of PA, we can have both:  
(i) ~(PA proves: F(x1, x2, x3, ... , xn)), and 
(ii)  (Ax1, Ax2, Ax3, ..., Axn)(PA proves: F(x1, x2, x3, ... , xn)), where the domain 
of xi  is the set of natural numbers.  
In other words, we cannot have a situation where a well-formed formula such as F(x) is 
unprovable in PA, but F(1), F(2), F(3), ... are all provable, if PA is both simply 
consistent and omega-constructive, where n denotes the numeral representing2 the natural 
number n in the formal system PA.  
We name such an omega-constructive PA system ‘first order omega-Arithmetic’, and 
refer to it as omega-PA. 
1.2.  The significance of omega-constructivity 
This definition implicitly reflects the thesis that an infinite, compound, meta-assertion 
such as "F(1) is provable in PA & F(2) is provable in PA & F(3) is provable in PA & ..." 
is simply a convenient way of expressing and visualising the meta-assertion “F(n) is 
provable in PA for all n”, where n is intuitively taken to range over the natural numbers.  
                                               
2  See also Gödel (Gödel 1931 Def17). 
 
1.3.  Constructive PA should be intuitive 
We argue that, in a constructive formal system of PA that is intended to formalise the 
natural numbers - where the intended domain of x under interpretation contains, and 
preferably consists only of, elements that correspond to the numerals that represent the 
natural numbers in the formal system - the meta-assertion “F(x) is provable in PA” 
should intuitively translate as equivalent to “F(n) is provable in PA for all n”, where n is 
intuitively taken to range over the natural numbers. 
So a formal system that is not omega-constructive is counter-intuitive. 
1.4.  Differentiating between omega-constructivity and omega-completeness 
We note the difference between omega-constructivity and omega-completeness.  
PA is said to be omega-complete if and only if there is a no well-formed formula F(x) 
with one free variable such that: 
(i) ~( PA proves: (Ax)F(x)), and 
(ii)  (An)( PA proves: F(n)), where the domain of n is the set of natural 
numbers. 
Now, in our intended formal system PA of the natural numbers, an infinite, compound, 
meta-assertion such as "F(1) is provable in PA & F(2) is provable in PA & F(3) is 
provable in PA & ... " can also be intuitively asserted as a consequence of a meta-proof 
of the generalization "(Ax)(F(x) is provable in PA)". 
However, we need to consider the possibility that, under interpretation, such a PA may 
admit an infinite domain for x that is not denumerable, or that the generalisation 
"(Ax)(F(x)" may be a well-formed formula, but an ill-defined proposition under 
interpretation (which could be the case if F(x) either represents, or translates under 
interpretation as, a vague predicate). 
It follows that, under our intended formalisation, the denumerable meta-assertion "F(1) is 
provable in PA & F(2) is provable in PA & F(3) is provable in PA & ..." cannot be 
assumed to conversely yield a proof of '(Ax)F(x)’ in PA. 
So a system that is not omega-complete is not necessarily counter-intuitive. 
1.5.  The relevance of omega-constructivity  
To see the relevance of omega-constructivity to PA, we consider in §1.5 to §1.7 the 
primitive recursive (Mendelson p120) predicate prf'(u, y), which we define3 as true if and 
only if u is the Gödel-number (Podnieks 2001 Section 5.2) of a well-formed formula 
F(x1, x2, x3, ... , xn) of PA, containing the free variables x1, x2, x3, ... , xn, and y is the 
Gödel-number of a proof in PA of F(u, x2, x3, ... , xn).  
1.6.  prf'(x, y) is a Turing decidable predicate 
Now we can construct a Turing machine that, given any u and v, will decode (Podnieks 
2001 Excercise 5.3) u into F(x1, x2, x3, ... , xn), check whether x1 occurs in it, construct 
F(u, x2, x3, ... , xn) by replacing x1 wherever it occurs by u, decode v, check if v is a 
proof sequence, and finally check to see if F(u, x2, x3, ... , xn) is the last well-formed 
formula in the proof sequence coded by v.  
Thus prf'(x, y) is a Turing-decidable predicate. 
                                               
3  This definition is based on the predicate W1(u,y) used by Mendelson (p143) in his 
proof of Gödel’s undecidability theorem. It corresponds to Gödel’s (1931 p188 eqn 8.1) 
primitive recursive predicate xB(Sb(y : (19, z(y)))). 
 
1.7.  The Representation Theorem 
By Podnieks Representation Theorem (Section 3.3) we can therefore construct a PA-
formula PRF'(x, y) expressing the predicate prf'(x, y) such that, for any given k1, k2:  
(i) prf'(k1, k2) is true   =>   PA proves: PRF'(k1, k2), and 
(ii) ~prf'(k1, k2) is true   =>   PA proves: ~PRF'(k1, k2). 
We let r be the Gödel-number of ~PRF'(x1, x2). 
We consider the well-formed formula ~PRF'(r, x2).  
Now, from the definition of prf'(u, y), it follows that4:  
(iii) prf'(r, y) is true  <=>  y is the Gödel-number of a proof in PA 
of ~PRF'(r, x2). 
1.8.  Is PA both simply consistent and omega-constructive? 
In §1.8 to §1.11, we next address the question: Can PA be both simply consistent and 
omega-constructive? 
Let us assume that it is, and that omega-PA proves ~PRF'(r, x2), so that some natural 
number k is the Gödel-number of this proof.   
Then, by §1.7(iii), prf'(r, k) is true and hence,  
omega-PA proves: PRF'(r, k).  
However, by our premise, we have that,  
                                               
4  This meta-mathematical equivalence seems to be the counter-part of Podnieks formal 
self-reference lemma. 
 
omega-PA proves: ~PRF'(r, x2), and so 
omega-PA proves: ~PRF'(r, k).  
Therefore, since omega-PA is assumed simply consistent, it follows that ~PRF'(r, x2) 
cannot be proved in omega-PA. 
1.9.  Consequences of the omega-constructivity of omega-PA 
We thus have from the omega-constructivity of omega-PA that it is not the case that:  
(An)(omega-PA proves: ~PRF'(r, n)). 
Now, since prf'(x, y) is primitive recursive, if ~prf'(r, y) is true for all y, it follows meta-
mathematically from §1.7(ii) that:  
(An)(omega-PA proves: ~PRF'(r, n)).  
So, if it is not the case that,  
(An)(omega-PA proves: ~PRF'(r, n)),  
then it is not the case that,   
~prf'(r, y) is true for all y.  
Hence we have, meta-mathematically, that:  
~prf'(r, k) is false for some k, 
prf'(r, k) is true, 
omega-PA proves: ~PRF'(r, x2). 
1.10.  The meta-mathematical inconsistency in omega-PA 
We have thus demonstrated that if PA is assumed both simply consistent and omega-
constructive, then we have the meta-mathematical inconsistency:  
(i) omega-PA proves: ~PRF'(r, x2)    
=>   ~(omega-PA proves: ~PRF'(r, x2)), and 
(ii) ~(omega-PA proves: ~PRF'(r, x2))    
=>   omega-PA proves: ~PRF'(r, x2). 
1.11.  A simply consistent PA is neither omega-constructive, nor omega-complete 
So, if standard first order Arithmetic PA is assumed simply consistent, then it cannot be 
omega-constructive in the sense defined above in §1.1.  
Since, in standard first order Arithmetic PA, we have that: 
PA proves: F(x)   <=>   PA proves: (Ax)F(x), 
it follows that standard first order Arithmetic PA is, additionally, not omega-complete. 
1.12.  What is the significance of the omega-incompleteness of PA? 
Now, if standard first order Arithmetic PA is assumed simply consistent, then there is the 
well-formed formula ~PRF'(r, x2) with one free variable such that: 
(i) ~(PA proves: (Ax2)~PRF'(r, x2)), and 
(ii)  (An)(PA proves: ~PRF'(r, n)). 
The question arises: What is the significance of such omega-incompleteness of PA? 
To get some indirect perspective on this question, let us for a moment consider the 
Gödelian argument. 
1.13.  The Gödelian argument 
One interpretation, of the Gödelian argument as offered by J.R.Lucas, is the thesis that 
there is some non-mechanistic element - knowledge of which is Platonistically available 
to human intelligence but cannot be reflected in any machine intelligence - that is 
involved in establishing that a well-formed formula such as (x)F(x) is formally 
unprovable in PA, yet translates into a true proposition under interpretation in the 
standard model.  
However, if the foregoing arguments are simply non-constructive and intuitionistically 
objectionable, but not non-mechanistic, then the Platonistic elements of the reasoning are 
built into the formal logic itself, and can be built equally rigorously, independent of any 
model, into machine intelligence. 
1.14.  omega-provable propositions in PA 
Thus if we introduce: 
~(PA proves: (Ax)F(x))   &   (An)(PA proves: F(n)) 
as the meta-definition of: 
‘(Ax)F(x)’ is omega-provable in PA, 
we can reasonably argue that PA establishes the meta-assertions: 
‘(Ax2)~PRF'(r, x2)’ is omega-provable in PA, 
‘~PRF'(r, n)’ is provable in PA for every natural number n,  
‘~PRF'(r, n)’ is true for every natural number n in every model of PA,  
‘(An)~PRF'(r, n)’ is true in every model of PA,  
although PA is unable to prove (Ax2)~PRF'(r, x2), and even though (Ax)~PRF'(r, x) 
may not hold true in every model of PA. 
1.15.  What kind of propositions are omega-provable? 
The question arises: What makes a proposition such as (Ax)F(x) omega-provable? 
An obvious possibility, as remarked earlier, is that F(x) may be a well-formed formula, 
but translate under interpretation into a vague or ill-defined predicate similar to the 
paradoxical self-referential constructions that give rise to the various linguistic, logical 
and mathematical antinomies. 
We note that Gödel’s aim in his 1931 paper “On formally undecidable propositions of 
Principia Mathematica and related systems I” was not to eliminate the antinomies, but to 
eliminate imprecision of expression in the concepts of truth and proof by rigorously 
formalising (Gödel 1931 p176) first order logic and Arithmetic. 
Accordingly, in his 1934 lecture notes (Davis p46) “On undecidable propositions of 
formal mathematical systems”, Gödel notes that “We shall depend on the theory of types 
as our means for avoiding paradox”. 
So, although F(x) may be provable for any given x, the provability of (Ax)F(x) may, in 
some interpretation, involve an implicit reference to an ill-defined totality of all x that 
satisfy F(x). 
In such a case, assuming the provability of (Ax)F(x) must yield a contradiction from 
which we can either conclude the inconsistency of PA, or deduce the unprovability of 
(Ax)F(x) in a simply consistent PA. 
The latter conclusion could also then imply the Platonistic existence of some model of 
PA in which (Ax)~PRF'(r, x) does not hold true, even though (An)~PRF'(r, n) is true 
in every model of PA. 
Clearly, in this case, the omega-provability of arithmetical assertions is better viewed as a 
reflection of the ‘vagueness or ill-definedness’ of some predicate inherent in their 
construction, where the range of values for which the predicate is satisfied under 
interpretation does not form a well-defined totality that can be validly referenced within a 
logical proposition. 
1.16.  The Platonistic axiom of reducibility and PA  
A second possibility (not unrelated to the first) is that the formal system itself may have 
been defined Platonistically. 
Thus the meta-equivalence in standard first order Arithmetic PA, that: 
PA proves: F(x)   <=>   PA proves: (Ax)F(x) 
can also be viewed as reflecting elements of  the Platonistic Axiom of Reducibility of the 
Principia (or the Comprehension Axiom of set theory : Gödel 1931 p178).  
It essentially meta-postulates that the closure of every provable well-formed formula of 
PA containing free variables yields a provable well-formed formula of PA. 
In every interpretation, the above can be taken to assert that if, for a well-formed formula 
F(x), x satisfies F(x) whenever x is representable in the formal system, then we can 
conclude (Ax)F(x) in the interpretation, and hence that the domain of x is well-defined 
(i.e. it forms a well-defined set in set theory) under the interpretation.5 
1.17.  What is the significance of: (Ax)F(x) is omega-provable? 
To sum up, we note that, if (Ax)F(x) is omega-provable, then the following hold. 
 (i) ‘~(PA proves: (Ax)F(x))’ holds meta-mathematically.  
This can be taken to intuitively imply either that there is some model of PA in 
which there is a non-constructive element (interpreted Platonistically) in the 
domain of x that is not representable in PA, and is such that it does not satisfy 
the predicate F(x), or that the totality of values for which the predicate ‘F’ 
holds over the domain of x in some model of PA is ill-defined. 
(ii)  ‘(An)(PA proves: F(n))’ holds meta-mathematically, where the domain of n 
is the set N of natural numbers.  
This intuitively implies that, in every model of PA, the predicate F(x) is 
satisfied constructively by every interpretation of the numeral n in the domain 
of x. 
                                               
5  This indicates that we may need to formally distinguish between the meta-statement 
‘F(x) is provable’, and the meta-statement ‘(x)F(x) is provable’. The former may 
reasonably be taken to intuitively assert that a well-formed formula ‘F(x)’ is provable for 
any given, even if unspecified, element x of every domain in every model. The latter, 
however, is intuitively the stronger assertion that ‘F(x)’ is provable for every element x 
of any domain; it implicitly postulates that the domain of x, in every model, is a well-
defined totality for the predicate ‘F’, and so it can be validly referenced in a logical 
proposition. Equating the two can thus be viewed as unreasonable, and so counter-
intuitive.  
 
(iii)  ‘(Ax)(PA proves: F(x))’ holds meta-mathematically.  
This includes (ii), but intuitively implies additionally that if, in any model of 
PA, there is (interpreted Platonistically) some element in the domain of x that is 
not an interpretation of the numeral n, but is otherwise representable in PA, 
then it necessarily satisfies F(x). 
1.18.  Why is first order Arithmetic not omega-constructive? 
The choice of our formal system of first order Arithmetic may thus depend on whether it 
is our (tacit) intent to deny validity to well-formed formulas that reflect ill-defined 
elements under every interpretation, or to admit them as well-formed formulas and accept 
the intuitively artificial conclusion that they are formally unprovable, but translate into 
true propositions under interpretation. 
The question arises: Assuming PA corresponds to the latter alternative, can we suitably 
modify PA so that, similar to the development of standard set theory ZF, we arrive at a 
PA system where we prevent the representation of predicates with ill-defined totalities of 
the values that satisfy them under interpretation, and where we eliminate the non-
constructive elements that underlie the logic of PA? 
In the next section, we therefore address the question: Why is standard first order 
Arithmetic PA not omega-constructive? 
Chapter 2.  Why is first order Arithmetic not omega-constructive? 
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2.0.  Introduction 
In this second section we locate specific non-constructivity in PA and trace it to the 
particular closed Induction axiom schema of PA, and the strong Generalisation rule of 
inference of first order predicate calculus.   
2.1.  The Representation Theorem 
We start by noting that, in the argument that a simply consistent PA cannot be omega-
constructive, the only overt assumptions (cf. Gödel 1931 p190-191) were that the axioms 
and rules of inference of PA are recursively definable, and Podnieks 
Representation Theorem (Section 3.3). 
The constructive nature of the first assertion is easily established from first principles by 
direct examination of the 45 functions and relations defined recursively by Gödel (cf. 
Gödel 1931 p182-186).  
We thus take a closer look at the second assertion that every Turing-computable function 
f(x, y) can be represented by a PA formula F(x, y, z) such that, for every set of natural 
numbers k, m, n, if f(k, m) = n then: 
(i) PA proves: F(k, m, n). 
(ii) PA proves: (Az)(~(z=n) => ~F(k, m, z)). 
2.2.  What is the formal representation of f(x, y) in PA? 
Assuming that a function is Turing-computable if and only if it is recursive, we consider 
the case where f(x, y) is a recursive function, defined by: 
(i) f(x, 0) = g(x), 
(ii) f(x, (y+1)) = h(x, y, f(x, y)), 
(iii) where g(x1) and h(x1, x2, x3) are recursive functions of lower rank6 that 
are represented in PA by well-formed formulas G(x1, x2) and H(x1, x2, x3, 
x4). 
Now Mendelson shows (p131 & p132) that f(x1, x2) is represented by the well-formed 
formula F(x1, x2, x3): 
(Eu)(Ev)[((Ew)(Bt(u, v, 0, w) & G(x1, w))) & Bt(u, v, x2, x3) & (Aw)(w< x2 => 
(Ey)(Ez)(Bt(u, v, w, y) & Bt(u, v, (w+1), z) & H(x1, w, y, z))]. 
                                               
6  In the web translation of Gödel 1931 Proposition V this is referred to as the ‘degree’ of 
the recursive function. 
 
2.3.  Gödel’s Beta function 
Defining Gödel’s Beta-function7, ß(x1, x2, x3) = rm(1+( x3+ 1).x2, x1), where rm(x, y) is 
the remainder obtained on dividing y by x,  the well-formed formula Bt(x1, x2, x3, x4) in 
§2.2 above is a representation in PA of ß(x1, x2, x3), and is the well-formed formula 
(Mendelson p131):  
(Ew)( x1 = ((1 + (x3 + 1). x2).w + x4) & (x4 < 1 + (x3 + 1). x2)). 
2.4.  Can F(x, y, z) create a logical paradox in PA? 
Having represented f(x, y) in PA by F(x, y, z) for every set of natural numbers k, m, n 
such that f(k, m) = n, the question arises: Is the well-formed formula F(x, y, z) well-
defined in PA? 
In other words, can we ensure that the recursive predicate f(x, y) has not been represented 
by tacitly postulating a well-formed formula F(x, y, z) of PA as well-defined, which may 
implicitly admit the possibility of a formal logical paradox in PA? 
2.5.  The ‘Liar’ paradox 
To see the significance of this question, we review the earlier paradox, loosely ascribed to 
Epimenides, which arises obviously if we introduce by definition a ‘Liar’ expression, 
                                               
7  Gödel’s Beta-function (Mendelson p131; Gödel 1931 Lemma 1) may be loosely taken 
to represent a given finite sequence. Formally, for any given sequence f(1), f(2), ..., f(n), 
we can always construct some x1 and x2 such that, for all i<n, ß(x1, x2, i) = f(i). We note, 
however, that the denumerable sequences f(1), f(2), ... , f(n), mk where k>0 and mk? ml if 
k? l, are represented by denumerable, distinctly different, Beta-functions ß(xk,1, xk,2, i) 
respectively. There are thus denumerable pairs xk,1, xk,2 for which ß(xk,1, xk,2, i) represents 
any given sequence f(1), f(2), ... , f(n). 
 
which reads as “The ‘Liar’ proposition is a lie”, as a valid proposition within the 
language in which the expression is constructed. 
Clearly the grammar of an ordinary language, which governs the construction of words 
and propositions of the language for use as a means of general unrestricted 
communication, does not contain the specification necessary to prohibit the creation by 
definition of such vague, or ill-defined, self-referential expressions that have the formal 
form of a proposition, but which are devoid of both communicative content and meaning.  
2.6.  The ‘Russell’ paradox 
Russell’s expression, within set theory, for a set ‘Russell’ whose elements are all, and 
only, those sets of the Theory that do not belong to themselves, is equally paradoxical. 
Here also the axioms and logical rules of inference of the theory, which govern the 
construction of sets for use in a more restricted and precise language of mathematical 
communication, do not contain the specification necessary to satisfactorily prohibit the 
creation by definition of vague, ill-defined or inconsistent entities that apparently harbour 
concealed concepts involving unruly infinite sets.  
2.7.  Creation through definition 
We note that definitions are essentially arbitrary assignments of convenient names within 
a language or theory for expressing complex reasoning in a compact, more readable, and 
easier to grasp form. 
The paradoxes indicate that unrestricted definitions may admit creation of well-formed 
expressions within the language or theory that lead to an inconsistency. Clearly such 
expressions must be considered as ill-defined within the language or theory. 
It follows that a language or theory that admits such well-formed expressions as well-
defined cannot be reasonably assumed to be simply consistent. 
2.8.  Well-defined well-formed formulas of PA 
Now the formal response towards the containment (as distinct from the resolution) of 
such paradoxes in PA appears to be the implicit thesis that if a well-formed formula is 
provable in PA, then it necessarily represents a function or predicate that is well-defined 
in PA.  
We may, therefore, reasonably assume that such well-formed formulas do not affect the 
formal consistency of the axioms of PA. 
Thus, to ensure that F(x1, x2, x3) does not introduce an inconsistency in PA, Mendelson 
argues (p134) that F(x1, x2, x3) strongly represents f(x1, x2) in PA, in the sense that: 
PA proves: (E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3), 
where ‘E1x3’ defines uniqueness (Mendelson p79). 
However, in the light of our argument in the preceding paragraph, if F(x1, x2, x3) admits 
construction of well-formed formulas in PA that translate, under interpretation, as 
circular, ill-defined or vaguely defined predicates such as those that lead to the logical 
antinomies, then the strong representability of F(x1, x2, x3) in PA provides reasonable 
grounds for arguing that PA is itself an ill-defined system.  
2.9.  What does PA prove  constructively by (E1x3)F(k, m, x3)? 
We therefore consider in some detail the significance of the formal provability, in PA, of 
the well-formed formula (E1x3)F(k, m, x3) for any given numerals k, m: 
PA proves: (E1x3)(Eu)(Ev)[((Ew)(Bt(u, v, 0, w) & G(k, w))) & Bt(u, v, m, x3) & 
(Aw)(w< m => (Ey)(Ez)(Bt(u, v, w, y) & Bt(u, v, (w+1), z) & H(k, 
w, y, z))]. 
Now “PA proves: (E1x3)F(k, m, x3)” intuitively asserts that, for any given natural 
numbers k, m, we can construct natural numbers x3 (uniquely), u, v that define a Beta-
function such that ß(u, v, 0) = g'(k) and, for all i<m, ß(u, v, i) = h'(k, i, f'(k, i)), and ß(u, 
v, m) = x3, where f'(x1, x2), g'(x1) and h'(x1, x2, x3) are any recursive functions that are 
formally represented by F(x1, x2, x3), G(x1, x2) and H(x1, x2, x3, x4) respectively such 
that: 
(i) f'(k, 0) = g'(k), 
(ii) f'(k, (y+1)) = h'(k, y, f'(k, y)) for all y<m, 
(iii) g'(x1) and h'(x1, x2, x3) are recursive functions that are assumed to be of 
lower rank than f'(x1, x2). 
For any arbitrarily given sequence of natural numbers k0, k1, ... , kn, we can clearly 
determine an infinity of values of up, vp, kp such that the Beta-function ß(up, vp, i) = ki 
for all 0 =< i =< n, and ß(up, vp, (n+1)) = kp. 
Hence the PA provability of (E1x3)F(k, m, x3) is simply the intuitive assertion that, for 
any given natural numbers k and m, we can always construct some (non-unique) pair of 
natural numbers u, v such that the Beta-function ß(u, v, i) represents the first m terms, 
i.e. f'(k, 0), f'(k, 1), ... , f'(k, m), which are common to every primitive recursive function 
such as f'(x1, x2) that is formally represented by F(x1, x2, x3). 
We can see that this is constructively provable for any given natural numbers k and m 
since, given F(x1, x2, x3), we can determine a suitable Turing machine to construct the 
sequence f'(k, 0), f'(k, 1), ... , f'(k, m) uniquely and verify the assertion. 
We note, however, that if g is the Gödel-number of any Turing-computable proof of 
(E1x3)F(k, m, x3) as above then, trivially, g>m.  
We cannot thus conclude from the above argument that there is necessarily a Turing-
computable constructive proof of the existence of a PA-formula that yields the non-
terminating sequence f(k, 0), f(k, 1), ... , f(k, m), ..., which we could therefore take as 
representing the function f(k, y) uniquely. 
2.10.  Mendelson’s proof of PA proves: (E1x3)F(k, m, x3) 
The Turing-decidability of the assertion (E1x3)F(k, m, x3) is reflected in Mendelson’s 
proof of the above (p133), which relies on an essentially constructive meta-induction 
argument as below that does not appeal to strong Generalisation: 
PA proves: (E1x3)F(0, 0, x3)  
(Am)[[PA proves: (E1x3)F(0, m, x3)]   =>   [PA proves: (E1x3)F(0, m+1, x3)]] 
(Am)[PA proves: (E1x3)F(0, m, x3)] 
(Ak)(Am)[[PA proves: (E1x3)F(k, m, x3)]   =>   [PA proves: (E1x3)F(k+1, m, 
x3)]] 
(Ak)(Am)[PA proves: (E1x3)F(k, m, x3)] 
2.11.  What does (E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3) assert? 
Turning next to the issue of strong representability, we consider the meta-assertion:  
PA proves: (E1x3)(Eu)(Ev)[((Ew)(Bt(u, v, 0, w) & G(x1, w))) & Bt(u, v, x2, x3) 
& (Aw)(w< x2 => (Ey)(Ez)(Bt(u, v, w, y) & Bt(u, v, (w+1), z) & 
H(x1, w, y, z))]. 
Now “PA proves: (E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3)” intuitively asserts that, for variable x1, x2, we can 
similarly construct natural numbers x3 (uniquely), u, v that define a Beta-function such 
that ß(u, v, 0) = g'(x1) and, for all i =< x2, ß(u, v, i) = h'(x1, i, f'(x1, i)), where f'(x1, x2), 
g'(x1) and h'(x1, x2, x3) are any recursive functions that are formally represented by F(x1, 
x2, x3), G(x1, x2) and H(x1, x2, x3, x4) respectively such that: 
(i) f'(x1, 0) = g'(x1), 
(ii) f'(x1, (y+1)) = h'(x1, y, f'(x1, y)) for all y< x2, 
(iii) g'(x1) and h'(x1, x2, x3) are recursive functions that are assumed to be of 
lower rank than f'(x1, x2). 
Hence the PA provability of (E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3) interprets as the intuitive assertion that, 
even for variable x1 and x2, we can determine some pair of natural numbers u, v such that 
the Beta-function ß(u, v, i) represents any indeterminate number, x2, of terms, i.e. the 
sequence f'(x1, 0), f'(x1, 1), ... , f'(x1, x2), of every primitive recursive function such as 
f'(x1, x2) that is formally represented by F(x1, x2, x3). 
2.12.  The introduction of Platonism into PA 
In other words, the PA provability of (E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3) corresponds to the intuitive, non-
constructive, assertion that there is (interpreted Platonistically) some Beta-function ß(u, 
v, i) that represents the sequence f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1), ... , f(x1, x2) for any unspecified, and 
indeterminate, length x2.  
The above is, essentially, the assertion that F(x1, x2, x3) uniquely represents f(x1, x2) in 
PA. It implicitly implies that the non-terminating sequence of values f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1), ..., 
f(x1, x2), ... forms a well-defined totality, which can be uniquely named and referenced in 
PA by some (unique up to isomorphism) Beta-function ßf(u, v, i). 
The PA provability of (E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3) thus corresponds to a non-constructive assertion 
of the Platonistic existence of such a totality.  
2.13.  How does PA prove the Platonistic assertion (E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3)? 
The question arises: How, then, does PA prove an essentially Platonistic assertion such as 
(E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3)? 
After establishing the argument by which we can show that PA proves: (E1x3)F(k, m, 
x3), Mendelson notes, indicating outlines of the proof (p134), that, for primitive recursive 
functions (Mendelson p120): 
“The part of the proof given above to show that the recursion rule does not lead 
out of the class of representable functions can be strengthened to yield strong 
representability ...” 
Mendelson’s indicated argument appears to be that we can establish by meta-induction: 
PA proves: (E1x3)F(0, 0, x3)  
[PA proves: (E1x3)F(0, x2, x3)]   =>   [PA proves: (E1x3)F(0, x2+1, x3)] 
PA proves: (E1x3)F(0, x2, x3) => (E1x3)F(0, x2+1, x3) 
PA proves: (Ax2)(( E1x3)F(0, x2, x3) => (E1x3)F(0, x2+1, x3))     ... Gen 
PA proves: (Ax2)( E1x3)F(0, x2, x3)     ... Induction 
 [PA proves: (Ax2)( E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3)]   =>   [PA proves: (Ax2)( E1x3)F(x1+1, x2, 
x3)] 
PA proves: (Ax2)( E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3) => (Ax2)( E1x3)F(x1+1, x2, x3) 
PA proves: (Ax1)((Ax2)(( E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3) => (Ax2)( E1x3)F(x1+1, x2, x3)) 
PA proves: (Ax1)(Ax2)( E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3) 
PA proves: (E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3) 
Assuming that this correctly represents Mendelson’s intention, the validity of the above 
reasoning gives the necessary validity to F(x1, x2, x3) as a well-defined well-formed 
formula that is consistent with the axioms of PA. 
2.14.  At which point does Platonism enter PA formally? 
The question arises: At which point does PA formalise Platonistic elements? 
We note that, in the above argument, the non-constructive conclusions in the reasoning 
are those thart arise from application of the closed Induction axiom schema (Mendelson 
p103) and the strong Generalisation rule of inference of first order predicate calculus 
(Mendelson p57): 
(i) Closed Induction : (F(0) & ((Ax)(F(x) => F(x+1))) => (Ax)(F(x) 
(ii) Strong Generalisation : (Axi)F(xi) follows from F(xi) 
These are the only assumptions that can be objected to intuitionistically in the above 
argument to provide legitimacy for F(x1, x2, x3) as a well-defined well-formed formula 
that is consistent with the axioms of PA. 
2.15.  Is PA necessarily Platonistic? 
The question arises: Assuming that PA is simply consistent, does the above argument, 
that PA is a non-constructive system, imply that PA is necessarily Platonistic? 
To put the query in perspective, we note that the meta-assertion: 
PA proves: F(xi) 
intuitively represents a denumerable infinity of formal statements: 
PA proves: F(k), 
where only the denumerable terms that can be expressed in PA, such as k, are substituted 
for xi. 
However, the meta-assertion: 
PA proves: (Axi)F(xi) 
is a single formal assertion that, under interpretation in a model of PA, may translate into 
an infinitely-compound proposition that is not necessarily denumerably-compound. 
Since the two are formally equivalent in the presence of strong Generalisation, the 
question is then: Does strong Generalisation formalise Platonism8 in PA? 
                                               
8  Gödel’s Platonistic interpretation of strong Generalisation is implicit when he notes 
(Gödel 1931 p191 footnote 48a): “The true reason for the incompleteness which attaches 
to all formal systems of mathematics lies ... in the fact that the formation of higher and 
higher types can be continued into the transfinite ..., while, in every formal system, only 
2.16.  Is every model of PA necessarily infinite, but not denumerable? 
The above equivalence in PA also raises the question: Is every model of PA necessarily, 
infinite but not denumerable, since PA is shown to contain formally non-constructive 
elements. 
As we have argued in §1.17 of the previous section “Chapter 1. First order Arithmetic is 
not omega-constructive”, there is an in-built ambiguity in the construction of PA once it 
admits omega-provable propositions. 
We then face the possibility of predicates giving rise to well-defined well-formed 
formulas in PA that may not faithfully reflect our intuitive understanding of the natural 
numbers, but that are not obviously transfinite in nature. 
This ambiguity, prima facie, does not admit an unequivocal answer to the above question. 
2.17.  Is there a constructive PA? 
The question thus arises: Can we formally represent our intuitive Arithmetic of the 
natural numbers less ambiguously, and more faithfully? 
We address this question in the next section: Is there an omega-constructive first order 
Arithmetic?  
                                                                                                                                            
countable many are available. Namely, one can show that the undecidable propositions 
which have been constructed here always become decidable through adjunction of 
sufficiently high types (e.g. of the type omega to the system P). A similar result holds for 
axioms of set theory.” 
 
Chapter 3.  Is there an omega-constructive first order Arithmetic? 
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3.0.  Introduction 
In this third section we formally construct and briefly examine various systems of first 
order Arithmetic. We argue that we cannot use Gödel’s reasoning to prove that every 
primitive recursive function (Mendelson p120) can be strongly represented formally in all 
such systems. Hence it does not universally establish the existence of undecidable 
propositions that are true under interpretation. 
We finally construct an omega-constructive system of first order Arithmetic, omega-PA, 
where we replace the non-constructive closed Induction axiom schema by a constructive, 
open Induction axiom schema. 
We base omega-PA on a modified first order predicate calculus where we replace the 
strong Generalisation rule of inference I(ii) by a weaker omega-Constructivity rule of 
inference I(iii). 
We show that every model of standard PA is a model of omega-PA. We show further 
that every primitive recursive function cannot be strongly represented formally in omega-
PA if it is simply consistent. So, in omega-PA, Gödel’s reasoning does not establish the 
existence of undecidable propositions that are true under interpretation.  
We argue in this, and the next, section that Gödel mistakenly concluded (Gödel p190-
191) that the existence of undecidable propositions that are true under interpretation must 
follow from his reasoning in all the above formal systems of Arithmetic.  
We begin by reviewing in detail Mendelson’s definition (p103) of the system PA. This is 
essentially the formal system in which Gödel constructed his undecidable propositions.  
3.1.  The primitive symbols of a general first order predicate calculus K 
The system PA is based on a particularisation of the general first order predicate calculus 
K whose primitive symbols are (Mendelson p57): 
'~' (not), '=>' (implies), '(' (left parenthesis), ')' (right parenthesis), ',' (comma), 'x1, x2, ...' 
(denumerably many individual variables), 'A(n, j), (n, j >= 1)' (denumerably many 
predicate letters), 'f(n, j), (n, j >= 1)' (denumerably many function letters), and 'ai, (i>= 1)' 
(denumerably many constants).  
3.2.  The logical axioms of K 
The logical axioms of K are: 
K(1) A => (B => A) 
K(2) (A => (B => C)) => ((A => B) => (A => C)) 
K(3) (~B => ~A) => ((~B => A) => B) 
K(4) (Axi)A(xi) => A(t), if A(xi) is a well-formed formula of K and t is a term 
of K free for xi in A(xi). 
K(5) (Axi)(A => B) => (A => (A => (Axi)B) if A is a well-formed formula of K 
containing no free occurences of xi. 
3.3.  The rules of inference of K 
The rules of inference of K are: 
I(i) Modus Ponens: B follows from A and A => B. 
I(ii) Strong Generalisation: (Axi)A follows from A. 
3.4. Gödel’s formal system PA 
The particular system of first order predicate calculus that Mendelson uses (p103), to 
develop Gödel's reasoning in a formal first order Arithmetic, contains: 
A(i) a single predicate letter 'A' to represent equality A(t, s) between the terms t 
and s, which we express as ‘t=s’;  
A(ii) one individual constant 'a' which we write as ‘0’;  
A(iii) three function letters f, g and h to represent, respectively, the successor of 
‘t’, which we write as ‘t'’, addition, which we write as ‘t+s’, and 
multiplication, which we write as ‘t.s’.  
The axioms of Arithmetic that Gödel considered were Dedekind's axioms for number 
theory, known as Peano's Postulates, which are essentially as below (not necessarily 
independent): 
A(1) (x1 = x2) => ((x1 = x3) => (x2 = x3) 
A(2) (x1 = x2) => (x1' = x2') 
A(3) 0 ?  x1' 
A(4) (x1' = x2') => (x1 = x2) 
A(5) (x1 + 0) = 0 
A(6) (x1 + x2') = (x1 + x2)' 
A(7) x1.0 = 0 
A(8) x1. x2' = (x1. x2) + x1 
A(9) (x1 ?  0) => (Ex2)(x1 = x2') 
and the two meta-axiom schemas (more accurately, rules of inference) of closed 
and open Induction: 
A(10) For any wff F(x) of PA, from (F(0) and (Ax)(F(x)) => F(x')), we may 
conclude (Ax)F(x) 
A(11) For any wff F(x) of PA, from (F(0) and (F(x)) => F(x')) we may 
conclude F(x) 
3.5.  General Arithmetics : weak-GA 
If we eliminate strong Generalisation I(ii),  closed Induction A(10) and open Induction 
A(11) from PA, we obtain a weak first order general Arithmetic, weak-GA. 
Weak-GA is thus the axioms A(1) to A(9) of first order Arithmetic, as specified in §3.4, 
added to a first order predicate calculus A(i) to A(iii), as specified in §3.4, with only the 
Modus Ponens rule of inference I(i). 
Since all axioms of weak-GA are provable in PA, every interpretation and model of PA 
is an interpretation and model of weak-GA.  
However, in the absence of strong Generalisation I(ii), and closed Induction A(10), the 
argument of §2.13, establishing the strong representability of every recursive function, 
cannot be carried out in weak-GA.  
So, in weak-GA, Gödel’s reasoning does not establish the existence of undecidable 
propositions that are true under interpretation. 
3.6.  General Arithmetics : strong-GA 
If we strengthen weak-GA by adding the strong Generalisation rule of inference I(ii), we 
arrive at a stronger first order general Arithmetic, strong-GA.  
Strong-GA is thus the axioms A(1) to A(9) of first order Arithmetic, as specified in §3.4, 
added to a first order predicate calculus A(i) to A(iii), as specified in §3.4, with both the 
Modus Ponens rule of inference I(i) and the strong Generalisation rule of inference I(ii). 
Since all axioms of strong-GA are provable in PA, every interpretation and model of PA 
is an interpretation and model of strong-GA. 
However, in the absence of closed Induction A(10), the argument of §2.13, establishing 
the strong representability of every recursive function, still cannot be carried out in 
strong-GA.  
So, in strong-GA, Gödel’s reasoning does not establish the existence of undecidable 
propositions that are true under interpretation. 
3.7.  Peano Arithmetics : weak-PA 
If we add closed Induction A(10) to weak-GA, we arrive at a weak first order Peano 
Arithmetic, weak-PA.  
Weak-PA is thus the axioms A(1) to A(10) of first order Arithmetic, as specified in §3.4, 
added to a first order predicate calculus A(i) to A(iii), as specified in §3.4, with only the 
Modus Ponens rule of inference I(i). 
Since all axioms of weak-PA are provable in PA, every interpretation and model of PA is 
an interpretation and model of weak-PA. 
However, in the absence of strong Generalisation I(ii), the argument of §2.13, which 
establishes the strong representability of every recursive function, cannot be carried out 
in weak-PA.  
Hence, in weak-PA also, Gödel’s reasoning does not establish the existence of 
undecidable propositions that are true under interpretation. 
We note also that it is not obvious whether weak-PA proves weak-Induction A(11). 
3.8.  Peano Arithmetics : Standard PA 
We arrive at the standard first order Peano Arithmetic, standard PA, used by Gödel, 
when we add strong Generalisation I(ii) to weak-PA. 
Standard PA is thus the axioms A(1) to A(10) of first order Arithmetic, as specified in 
§3.4, added to a first order predicate calculus A(i) to A(iii), as specified in §3.4, with both 
the rules of inference, Modus Ponens I(i), and strong Generalisation I(ii). 
Since standard PA establishes the strong representability of every recursive function, we 
are now able to formally derive Gödel’s undecidable propositions in standard PA. 
However, as we have argued in the earlier sections, strong representability now admits 
closed well-formed formulas that refer to totalities, under interpretation, which are not 
reflected in the intuitive Arithmetic that is intended to be formalised by standard PA. 
3.9.  Closed Induction implies open Induction in PA 
We note that, in standard PA,  closed Induction A(10) implies open Induction A(11). 
Thus, from the closed Induction axiom schema A(10) in standard PA: 
Standard PA proves: (F(0)  &  Standard PA proves: (Ax)(F(x) => F(x+1)))  
=>  Standard PA proves: (Ax)F(x) 
we have that if: 
Standard PA proves: F(0)   &   Standard PA proves: F(x) => F(x+1) 
then: 
Standard PA proves: F(x) => F(x+1) 
Standard PA proves: (Ax)(F(x) => F(x+1))     ... Gen 
Standard PA proves: F(0)  &  Standard PA proves: (Ax)(F(x) => F(x+1)) 
Standard PA proves: (Ax)F(x) 
Standard PA proves: F(x) 
We thus have that: 
Standard PA proves: F(0)  &  Standard PA proves: (F(x) => F(x+1)))    
=>   Standard PA proves: F(x) 
Hence standard PA proves the open Induction axiom schema A(11), and so PA and 
standard PA are identical. 
3.10.  Can PA admit models of transfinite ordinals? 
Now we note that: 
PA proves: x+1 = 1+x 
PA proves: (Ax)(x+1 = 1+x). 
It follows that Cantor’s transfinite ordinal-Arithmetic CA, in which omega is a term for 
which we have that “omega +1” is not equal to “1+ omega”, is not a model of PA.  
3.11.  omega-constructive first order Arithmetics 
We next define a range of omega-constructive first order systems of Arithmetic, by 
introducing an intuitionistically unobjectionable omega-Constructivity rule of inference: 
I(iii) omega-Constructivity: F(x) is equivalent to (Ax)[“x is a numeral” => 
F(x)].  
Since “x is a numeral” is recursively definable, we note that I(iii) is a recursively 
definable rule of inference that is equivalent to the concept of omega-constructivity 
introduced in “Chapter 1. First order Arithmetic is not omega-constructive”. 
3.12.  omega-constructive Arithmetic : omega-GA 
If we strengthen weak-GA by adding the omega-Constructivity rule of inference I(iii), we 
arrive at a formal system of constructive omega-GA.  
omega-GA is thus the axioms A(1) to A(9) of first order Arithmetic, as specified in §3.4, 
added to a first order predicate calculus A(i) to A(iii), as specified in §3.4, along with the 
Modus Ponens rule of inference I(i) and the omega-Constructivity rule of inference I(iii). 
Since all axioms of omega-GA are provable in PA, every interpretation and model of PA 
is an interpretation and model of omega-GA. 
Also, in the absence of strong Generalisation I(ii), and closed Induction A(10), the 
argument of §2.13, establishing the strong representability of every recursive function, 
cannot be carried out in omega-GA.  
However, as we have shown in the earlier section, “Chapter 1. First order Arithmetic is 
not omega-constructive”, in any system of Arithmetic with the omega-Constructivity rule 
of inference I(iii), the assumption that every recursive function can be strongly 
represented leads to inconsistency in the system. 
Hence, in omega-GA, Gödel’s reasoning does not establish the existence of undecidable 
propositions that are true under interpretation. 
3.13.  The omega-constructive Peano Arithmetic : omega-PA 
If we now add open Induction A(11) to omega-GA, we arrive at a constructive formal 
system of Peano’s Arithmetic, omega-PA.  
omega-PA is thus axioms A(1) to A(9), A(11) of first order Arithmetic, as specified in 
§3.4, added to a first order predicate calculus A(i) to A(iii), as specified in §3.4, along 
with the Modus Ponens rule of inference I(i) and the omega-Constructivity rule of 
inference I(iii). 
Since the assumption that every recursive function can be strongly represented in any 
system of Arithmetic with the omega-Constructivity rule of inference I(iii) leads to 
inconsistency in the system, it follows that Gödel’s reasoning does not hold in any 
interpretation of omega-PA. 
We note that the open Induction axiom schema A(11) permits us to constructively 
establish in omega-PA, for open well-formed formulas F(x) for which we can prove both 
the well-formed formulas F(0) and F(x) => F(x+1), that the well-formed formula F(x) is 
provable, and so necessarily well-defined. 
3.14.  Every model of PA is a model of omega-PA 
Since all axioms of omega-PA are provable in PA, every interpretation and model of PA 
is an interpretation and model of omega-PA. 
Clearly, even though omega-PA does not prove closed Induction A(10), it is, intuitively, 
a natural and constructive formalisation of Peano’s Arithmetic. 
Moreover, Gödel’s reasoning does not establish the existence of undecidable 
propositions in omega-PA in a constructive and intuitionistically unobjectionable way, as 
he intended (Gödel 1931 p189). 
3.15.  The essential difference between PA and omega-PA 
We note that the essential difference between PA and omega-PA lies simply in their 
respective meta-assertions about the nature and scope of the valid consequences9 amongst 
the elements of the domain of each system under interpretation.  
Thus the strong Generalisation rule of inference, for instance, asserts that, if F(x) is 
provable, then (x)F(x) is provable, and so, under every interpretation, the range of values 
for which the predicate ‘F’ is satisfied can be referred to as a well-defined totality.  
In other words, the predicate ‘F’ is asserted, Platonistically, to be a characteristic of every 
element of the domain under every interpretation, irrespective of whether the element 
corresponds to any constructive representation within the formal system PA or not. 
In contrast, the meta-rule of omega-Constructivity rule of inference is the weaker, 
constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable assertion that, if F(x) is provable, this 
only implies that the predicate ‘F’ is asserted to be a provable characteristic of every 
element of the domain under interpretation that has a constructive representations within 
the formal system omega-PA. 
3.16.  Can omega-PA admit models of transfinite ordinals? 
We note that Cantor’s transfinite ordinal-Arithmetic, CA, contains the system of natural 
numbers and so, in the absence of strong Generalisation, all the axioms of omega-PA 
translate into true statements, in CA, about only the sub-domain N of natural numbers. 
Thus CA is a model of omega-PA.  
                                               
9  See also Peregrin - Section 11, Conclusions. 
 
This reflects the fact that omega-PA permits transfinite interpretations in which relations 
that hold in any denumerable sub- domain of the interpretation may not hold in the entire 
domain of the interpretation. 
For instance, although: 
omega-PA proves: x+1 = 1+x 
we also have: 
~(omega-PA proves: (Ax)(x+1 = 1+x)). 
3.17.  Can we strengthen omega-PA 
This raises the natural question: At which point does omega-PA loose both its non-
constructive character, and its power to permit transfinite interpretations as above? 
In other words, can we strengthen omega-PA, and extend the range of its provable well-
formed formulas under interpretation, without losing its essentially constructive, and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable character? 
In the next section, we address this question. 
Chapter 4.  Are there stronger omega-constructive systems of first order 
Arithmetic? 
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4.0.  Introduction 
In this fourth section we begin by briefly reviewing the main arguments of the earlier 
sections. 
We then consider whether, and how, we may strengthen omega-PA. 
We use Parikh’s form of the Kreisel-Parson’s conjecture to constructively qualify 
quantification. This now allows a constructive formal system to refer to selective 
properties of non-constructive elements under interpretation  
We finally construct a strong omega2-PA, and show that the axioms, interpretations and 
models of strong omega2-PA, and the axioms, interpretations and models of PA, are 
identical, but have significantly different consequences. 
We conclude that the formal undecidability of Arithmetical propositions that are true 
under interpretation is a characteristic not of any relations that are Platonistically inherent 
in any Arithmetic of the natural numbers, but of the particular formalisation chosen to 
represent the Arithmetic. 
4.1.  An omega-constructive first order Arithmetic 
We argued in §1 and §2 that an omega-constructive system of Arithmetic is inconsistent 
with standard first order predicate calculus PA with strong Generalisation. 
4.2.  omega-PA 
In §3 we defined omega-PA, where we eliminated the closed Induction axiom schema 
A(10) of PA, and replaced the strong Generalisation rule of inference I(ii) of PA by the 
weaker omega-Constructivity rule of inference I(iii). 
4.3.  Some features of omega-PA 
We then argued that every model of PA is a model of omega-PA. 
We argued further that every primitive recursive function cannot be strongly represented 
in omega-PA. 
We also argued that omega-PA is intuitively a more natural and constructive formal 
system of Peano’s Arithmetic than PA. 
We argued that Gödel’s reasoning does not establish the existence of undecidable 
propositions in omega-PA, which are true under interpretation, in a constructive and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable way, as he intended (Gödel p189). 
4.4.  The difference between PA and omega-PA 
We argued in §3.15 that the essential difference between PA and omega-PA lay in their 
respective meta-assertions about the nature and scope of the valid consequences amongst 
the elements of the domain of each system under interpretation.  
We then posed the question: Can we strengthen omega-PA so that every model of a 
stronger omega-PA is a model of PA? 
4.5.  omega1-PA 
If we now add the closed Induction axiom schema A(10) to omega-PA, we arrive at a 
stronger, yet still constructive, formal system of Peano Arithmetic, omega1-PA. 
omega1-PA is thus axioms A(1) to A(11) of first order Arithmetic, as specified in §3.4, 
added to a first order predicate calculus A(i) to A(iii), as specified in §3.4, along with the 
Modus Ponens rule of inference I(i) and the omega-Constructivity rule of inference I(iii). 
Thus PA and omega1-PA have identical axioms, with identical interpretations and 
models. Prima facie, though, omega1-PA is an intuitively more natural and constructive 
formalisation of Peano’s Arithmetic than PA. 
Since the assumption that every recursive function can be strongly represented in any 
system of Arithmetic with the omega-Constructivity rule of inference I(iii) leads to 
inconsistency in the system, it follows that Gödel’s reasoning does not hold in any 
interpretation of omega1-PA. 
Further, although omega1-PA now proves the closed Induction axiom schema A(11), in 
the absence of the strong Generalisation rule of inference I(ii) of PA, we still cannot 
conclude either of: 
omega1-PA proves: ‘Closed Induction’   =>   ‘Open Induction’ holds in omega1-
PA 
‘Open Induction’ holds in omega1-PA   =>   omega1-PA proves: ‘Closed 
Induction’ 
whereas in PA we have both: 
PA proves: ‘Closed Induction’   =>   ‘Open Induction’ holds in PA 
‘Open Induction’ holds in PA   =>   PA proves: ‘Closed Induction’ 
4.6.  The conflict with model theory 
Now, although PA and omega1-PA have identical axioms, with identical interpretations 
and models, the difference in their rules of inference yield differing consequences 
amongst the well-formed formulas of the two formal systems, and hence amongst 
corresponding statements under interpretation. 
The difference is reflected in the fact that Cantor’s transfinite ordinal Arithmetic CA is 
not a model of PA, since:  
PA proves: x+1 = 1+x 
PA proves: (Ax)(x+1 = 1+x). 
However, in omega1-PA, we have that, as in omega-PA: 
omega1-PA proves: x+1 = 1+x 
~(omega1-PA proves: (Ax)(x+1 = 1+x)). 
Further, in the absence of strong Generalisation, all the axioms of omega1-PA translate 
into true statements, in Cantor’s transfinite ordinal-Arithmetic CA, about only the sub-
domain N of natural numbers. 
Thus CA is a model of omega1-PA. 
This appears to conflict with the implicit Platonistic thesis that it is the axioms of a 
formal system that essentially determine the logical consequences in the interpretation. 
4.7.  Introducing the omega-Specification rule of inference 
Can we strengthen omega1-PA further? 
We consider introducing Parikh’s form of the Kreisel-Parson’s conjecture in omega1-PA 
as a means for specifying essentially the conditions under which the closure of a 
provable, open, well-formed formula in omega1-PA yields a provable, closed, well-
formed formula of omega1-PA: 
I(iv) omega-Specification: (Ax)F(x) is provable in PA if, for each natural 
number n, there is a proof in PA of F(n), and its Gödel-number is less 
than some natural number k that is independent of n. 
4.8.  A yet stronger omega-calculus : omega2-PA 
We thus arrive at a yet stronger, constructive, formulation of the first order predicate 
calculus, omega2-calculus.  
omega2-PA is now the axioms A(1) to A(11) of first order Arithmetic, as specified in 
§3.4, added to a first order predicate calculus A(i) to A(iii), as specified in §3.4, along 
with the Modus Ponens rule of inference I(i), the omega-Constructivity rule of inference 
I(iii) and the omega-Specification rule of inference I(iv). 
Thus PA and omega1-PA, omega2-PA all have identical axioms, with identical 
interpretations and models. Again, omega2-PA appears intuitively a more natural and 
constructive formalisation of Peano’s Arithmetic than PA. 
We note that, as in PA, we now have that: 
omega2-PA proves: x+1 = 1+x 
omega2-PA proves: (Ax)(x+1 = 1+x) 
So, like PA, omega2-PA too does not admit Cantor’s transfinite ordinals in any model.  
Thus, though omega2-PA and omega1-PA are both constructive and have identical 
axioms, these too have significantly different logical consequences, highlighting again 
the apparent conflict with the implicit Platonistic thesis that it is the axioms of a formal 
system that essentially determine the logical consequences. 
4.9.  The Generalisation rule of inference holds for omega2-PA 
We note that, in omega2-PA, as in PA, the strong Generalisation rule of inference I(ii) 
holds, since we now have the meta-equivalence: 
omega2-PA proves: F(x)   <=>   omega2-PA proves: (Ax)F(x) 
It follows that, in omega2-PA, as in PA, we have: 
omega2-PA proves: ‘Closed Induction’   <=>   ‘Open Induction’ holds in 
omega2-PA 
4.10.  We cannot infer Gödel’s conclusions from his reasoning in omega2-PA 
However, omega2-PA retains the constructive and intuitionistically unobjectionable 
nature inherited from omega-PA. 
Thus, in sharp contrast to PA, omega2-PA does not admit the strong representation of 
every recursive function, and so Gödel’s reasoning establishing the existence of 
undecidable propositions cannot be carried out in omega2-PA. 
This follows from the fact that, if f(x, y) is a recursive function that is represented by a 
omega2-PA well-formed formula F(x, y, z), then the formal provability of (E1x3)F(k, m, 
x3) is the intuitive assertion (cf. §2.9) that, for any given natural numbers k and m, we 
can always construct some (non-unique) pair of natural numbers u, v such that the Beta-
function ß(u, v, i) represents the first m terms, i.e. f'(k, 0), f'(k, 1), ... , f'(k, m), that are 
common to every primitive recursive function such as f'(x1, x2) that is formally 
represented by F(x1, x2, x3). 
To prove this for any given F(x1, x2, x3), and given natural numbers k and m, we can 
determine a suitable Turing machine that will actually construct the sequence f'(k, 0), 
f'(k, 1), ... , f'(k, m) uniquely in order to verify the assertion. 
Clearly we can choose a k such that the number of terms in the above sequence, and so 
the Gödel-number of any Turing-computable proof, exceeds any given natural number 
k1. 
It follows that, in omega2-PA, we cannot assume that if the Gödel-number of a proof of: 
(E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3) 
is less than a given natural number k1, then the Gödel-number of a proof of: 
(E1x3)F(x+1, x2, x3) 
will also not exceed k1. 
We cannot thus assume that: 
omega2-PA proves: (E1x3)F(x1, x2, x3) => (E1x3)F(x+1, x2, x3). 
Hence we cannot assume that the argument of §2.13 will establish strong representability 
for every recursive function F(x1, x2, x3), as is necessary for Gödel’s reasoning to hold.  
In fact, since the assumption that every recursive function can be strongly represented in 
any system of Arithmetic with the omega-Constructivity rule of inference I(iii) leads to 
inconsistency in the system, it follows that Gödel’s conclusions do not logically follow 
from his reasoning in any interpretation of omega2-PA. 
We once more have the apparent conflict with the implicit Platonistic thesis that it is the 
axioms of a formal system that essentially determine the logical consequences in the 
interpretation. 
4.11.  Does Gödel’s reasoning hold even when his conclusions do not? 
The question arises: When can we infer Gödel’s conclusions from his reasoning? 
Chapter 5.  Gödel’s argument for undecidable proposition 
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5.0.  Introduction 
We have argued in this paper that though Gödel’s reasoning for the formal undecidability 
of true propositions is valid in all the above systems of Arithmetic, the inferences that can 
be validly drawn from it depend on the choice of the particular system. 
We now highlight the conditional nature of Gödel’s conclusions in a general Arithmetic 
GA. 
We also argue that Gödel’s undecidable formulas have the form of palimpsests that 
translate as ill-defined sentences in every interpretation 
5.1.  Every recursive function can be constructively represented in any Arithmetic 
We note that, by a lemma of Hilbert and Bernays, if f(x, y) is a recursive function, then it 
can be constructively represented in GA by the well-formed formula F(x1, x2, x3), as 
defined in §2.2 above. 
Specifically, this means that, in any of the above systems, we can construct Turing 
machines to verify that, for every set of natural numbers k, m, n, if f(k, m) = n then: 
(i) GA proves: F(k, m, n). 
(ii) GA proves: (Az)(~(z=n) => ~F(k, m, z)). 
5.2.  Every representation of a recursive function has a unique Gödel-number 
Since every recursive function, by definition, is built up from only a finite number of 
recursive functions of lower rank, we can further construct a Turing machine so that 
F(x1, x2, x3) can be expressed in only the primitive symbols of GA, and so uniquely 
coded and Gödel-numbered by some natural number F#. 
5.3.  Gödel’s recursive definition of provability  
Such a process of coding allows us, following Gödel, to define a recursive arithmetic 
relation prf(x, y), constructed out of 44 'simpler' recursive arithmetic functions and 
relations (Gödel 1931 p182), such that prf(x, y) is constructively true if and only if x is 
the Gödel-number of a finite proof sequence X in GA for some well-formed formula Y in 
GA whose Gödel-number is y. 
In other words, for any given natural numbers k, m, we can construct a Turing machine 
T(prf(k, m)) to write out the finite expression of GA whose Gödel-number is k, check if 
this is a valid proof sequence of GA, extract the last element of the sequence, and check 
if the Gödel-number of this element is m, returning the value T(prf(k, m))=0 if prf(k, m) 
is true and 1 if prf(k, m) is false. 
5.4.  Gödel’s Turing-computable q(x, y) 
We can now define a Turing-computable function q(x, y) which is true if and only if x is 
the Gödel-number of a well-formed formula K(z) of GA with a single free variable z, and 
y is the Gödel-number of a proof of K(x) in GA. 
In other words, given any numbers K#, M#, we can establish a Turing machine T(K#, 
M#) which will decode K# to yield the string K$ of GA, check if K$ is a well-formed 
formula in GA of the form K(z), decode and check if the string M$ is a valid proof 
sequence in GA, and then check if the last well-formed formula of the sequence is K(K#).  
If so, it establishes that q(K#, M#) is true; if not, it establishes that q(K#, M#) is false. 
5.5.  Gödel’s constructive self-reference lemma 
Hence the constructive self reference involved in Gödel's argument is: 
q(K#, M#) is true <=> M$ is a proof in GA of some well-formed formula K(K#) 
of GA. 
5.6.  Hilbert and Bernay’s representation lemma 
Now, by §5.1, since q(x, y) is recursive, there is a well-formed formula Q(x, y) of GA 
such that, for any natural numbers K#, M#: 
(i) q(K#, M#) is true => Q(K#, M#) is provable in GA, and 
(ii) q(K#, M#) is false => ~Q(K#, M#) is provable in GA. 
5.7.  The Gödelian premise 
We assume now that the well-formed formula P$ given by (Ay)(~Q(x, y)), and the well-
formed formula G$ given by (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)), are well-formed formulas of a simply 
consistent GA.  
5.8.  G$ is not provable 
Assuming G$ is provable in GA, let M$ be the proof of (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) in GA. 
We then have that q(P#, M#) is true by definition. 
Hence Q(P#, M#) is provable in GA, and so (Ey)Q(P#, y) is provable in GA. 
Hence ~(Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) is provable in GA, i.e. ~G$ is provable in GA 
We conclude that (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) is not provable in GA if GA is simply consistent, i.e. 
G$ is not provable in GA if GA is simply consistent 
5.9.  ~G$ is not provable 
Assuming ~G$ is provable in GA, it follows that G$ is not provable in GA if GA is 
simply consistent. 
Hence q(P#, y) is false for all y. 
It follows that ~Q(P#, y) is provable in GA for all y. 
So, in every interpretation of GA, ~Q(P#, y) translates as a true proposition for all y. 
However, since ~G$ is provable in GA, then ~(Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) is provable in GA. 
We then have the contradiction, in every interpretation of GA, that Q(P#, M#) translates 
as true for some M#, thus implying that GA is inconsistent.  
We conclude that ~G$ is not provable in GA if GA is simply consistent. 
5.10.  The essence of Gödel’s reasoning  
What we have above is that, if G$ is a well-formed formula in GA, then: 
(i) [(GA proves: G$)  =>  (GA proves: ~G$)]  =>  ~(GA proves: G$) 
(ii) [(GA proves: ~G$)  =>  (Every interpretation of GA is inconsistent)]  
=>  ~(GA proves: ~G$) 
5.11.  Gödel’s undecidable proposition GUS  
We consider now the well-formed formula G$ of GA, given by (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)), under 
interpretation. 
We argue below, in §5.14, that if (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) translates as a false sentence under any 
interpretation, then Q(P#, L#) translates as a true assertion for some L$. 
However, we then have the contradiction that (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) translates as a true 
sentence under the interpretation. 
We conclude that, if G$ is a well-formed formula in GA, then G$ translates into a true 
proposition in every interpretation of GA, even though both the well-formed formulas 
G$ and ~G$ are not provable in GA, i.e. in every interpretation of GA, G$ yields a 
Gödelian, formally undecidable but true, proposition GUS. 
5.12.  Gödel’s reasoning in PA  
Since, by §2.13, the well-formed formula F(x1, x2, x3) is well-defined in PA for any 
primitive recursive function f(x, y), the above reasoning yields Gödel’s proof of 
undecidability as a non-trivial assertion in PA. 
5.13.  Gödel’s reasoning does not establish his conclusions in most Arithmetics 
However, in all the other systems of Arithmetic defined above, Gödel’s reasoning does 
not establish his conclusions significantly since the well-formed formula F(x1, x2, x3) is 
not obviously well-defined in these systems for every primitive recursive function f(x, y). 
In systems of Arithmetic with an omega-constructive rule, in particular, the assumption 
§5.7 yields the meta-inconsistency: 
(i) [(GA proves: G$)  =>  (GA proves: ~G$)]  =>  ~(GA proves: G$) 
(ii) [~(GA proves: G$)  =>  (GA proves: G$)]  =>  (GA proves: G$) 
Ipso facto, both G$ and ~G$ are not well-defined, well-formed formulas in any systems 
of Arithmetic with an omega-constructive rule.10  
They are thus trivially unprovable, and Gödel’s formally undecidable proposition GUS 
trivially true, in every interpretation of a system of Arithmetic with an omega-
constructive rule. 
5.14.  The Palimpsest syndrome in standard PA : Overview of the argument 
We now argue that GUS essentially formalises the Liar sentence in standard PA by 
means of a “palimpsest”.11 
                                               
10  We note that Russell’s anomalous set R, defined by {x | ‘x is a member of R’, ‘x is not 
a member of x’} as the set of all sets that are not members of themselves, can also be 
expressed in terms of the primitive symbols of an axiomatic set theory S. However, the 
assumption that the well-formed formulas ‘R is a member of R’ and ‘R is not a member 
of R’ are well-defined, well-formed formulas of S is inconsistent with the axioms of S. 
 
11  The intention here is to translate the formula ‘(Ay)(~Q(P#, y))’ from standard PA into 
English in order to argue the point that the truth of this assertion, under any 
interpretation, does not depend on the interpretation into which it is translated, but on the 
truth of a factual assertion, pertaining to standard PA specifically, that is embedded in the 
formula ‘(Ay)(~Q(P#, y))’ itself in the form of a “palimpsest”. 
 
For example, albeit at an explicit level, the statement “The English word ‘tree’ contains 
four letters of the English alphabet” must remain true no matter into which language - 
standard PA, Sanskrit, sign-language etc. - it is translated; it contains an assertion of fact 
that cannot be altered by the language into which it is translated. 
 
If the destination-language contains the source-language, then it may indeed be able to 
determine the truth of factual assertions such as the above. If not, such assertions would 
be factually undecidable, at least until enough of the source-language is suitably adjoined. 
 
The thesis here is that every interpretation of Gödel’s formal system of standard PA in 
another language implicitly preserves the logical content of “named” entities; moreover, 
it subsumes standard PA and so contains the necessary wherewithal to determine the 
truth or falsity of factual assertions pertaining to the formal system of standard PA. 
 
We argue that, by virtue of its roots in the finite construction, through Gödel-numbering, 
of the primitive recursive relation q(P#, y), every interpretation of Gödel’s undecidable 
formula (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) can constructively be well-defined over the entire domain of 
any interpretation M in such a way that it is equivalent to the assertion: 
"For all y, the formula Y, whose Gödel-number is y, is not the interpretation of a 
finite proof sequence in standard PA for the formula (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)), whose Gödel-
number is P#, from the given set Axm of recursively defined axioms, and the given 
set Inf of recursively defined rules of inference, of standard PA." 
If standard PA is assumed consistent, this means either that the sentence (Ay)(~Q(P#*, 
y)) (where P#* is the interpretation in M of the numeral P#) can be interpreted as true in 
every interpretation M of standard PA (since the set Axm of axioms, and set Inf of rules 
of inference, of Gödel’s formal system of standard PA, are defined recursively), or the 
expression (Ay)(~Q(P#*, y)) treated as an ill-defined sentence in every M under 
interpretation. 
In other words, even if (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) is a well-defined formula in standard PA, there 
can be no consistent, non-standard model M of standard PA in which its interpretation 
(Ay)(~Q(P#*, y)) is uniquely false.  
(The latter would imply the contradiction that we can write out a finite proof 
sequence in standard PA for the unprovable formula (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) using only the 
given set Axm of axioms and the given set Inf of rules of inference of standard PA.) 
By virtue of Gödel’s completeness theorem for first order predicate calculus, it then 
follows that even if, like Russell's paradoxical set, the formula (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) appears 
to be a valid construction in standard PA, it must translate as an ill-defined sentence 
under every interpretation. 
In other words, there is an essential element in the definition of the formula (Ay)(~Q(P#, 
y)) such that, as in the case of the Liar sentence, we cannot constructively ascribe, or 
even non-constructively assume, either truth or falsity to/for the sentence (Ay)(~Q(P#*, 
y)) in an interpretation without inconsistency. 
It is a moot point whether we choose to treat (Ay)(~Q(P#*, y)) as an ill-defined 
“sentence” in every interpretation, or to treat standard PA as an inconsistent system. 
5.15.  The Extended Representation Lemma 
To give the argument in detail, we note the following meta-properties of recursive 
arithmetical relations f(y) where, if M is any interpretation of standard PA then, for all 
natural numbers n, and their representations n and interpretations n* in standard PA and 
M respectively: 
f(n) is true in the standard interpretation  
=> F(n) is provable in standard PA 
=> F(n*) is true in the interpretation M  
f(n) is false in the standard interpretation  
=> ~F(n) is provable in standard PA 
=> F(n*) is false in the interpretation M  
From this we conclude that, for every natural number n: 
f(n) is true in the standard interpretation  <=>  F(n*) is true in the interpretation M  
If we extend the definition of f(x) in the standard interpretation SI so that f(x) is false if x 
is not a natural number, then we have the Extended Representation meta-Lemma for 
recursive arithmetical functions f(x): 
  f(x) is true in the standard interpretation  <=>  F(x) is true in the interpretation M  
5.16.  The Palimpsest syndrome in standard PA : The proof 
We note that Gödel’s undecidable formula ~(Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) now translates as a well-
defined sentence over the entire domain of any interpretation M.  
The significance of the Extended Representation meta-Lemma is that, by virtue of 
Goedel’s original definition of the primitive recursive relation q(P#, y) - involving only 
finite Gödel-numbers of finite sets of well-formed, well-defined finite formulas and finite 
proof sequences of standard PA - its representation Q(P#, y) in standard PA is well-
defined only over the denumerable domain of the numerals n in standard PA, 
corresponding to the denumerable natural numbers n.12  
                                               
12  The central issue in these papers actually concerns the relationship of the formally 
represented elements to the elements that they seek to represent. Thus, if standard PA is 
to serve as the formal representation of intuitive arithmetic IA, then the questions that 
must be addressed are whether every element of intuitive arithmetic IA is represented in 
standard PA, and whether there are elements of standard PA that are not reflected in 
intuitive arithmetic IA. 
 
If we assume that our intuitive arithmetic IA is what we define as the standard 
interpretation SI of standard PA, then the question is whether every element of the 
standard interpretation SI is represented in standard PA, and whether there are elements 
of standard PA that are not reflected in the standard interpretation SI. 
 
In the former case, standard PA must be judged as inadequate to our intent; in the latter, 
as containing elements extraneous to our intent. 
  
Applying the same measure to the representation of, say, a function f(x) of the standard 
interpretation SI by some formula F(x, y) of standard PA, it follows that if f(x) is an 
intuitively well-defined function, then F(x, y) too must be a well-defined representation, 
It follows that, in any interpretation M of standard PA, the sentence ~(Ay)(~Q(P#*, y)) - 
which is equivalent to the assertion (Ey)Q(P#*, y) - is well-defined if and only if the 
relation Q(P#*, a*) is satisfied for some value a* in the domain of M that is an 
interpretation of some numeral a of standard PA. However, we cannot conclude from this 
that Q(P#*, a*) is well-defined - and so decidable - for every value a* in the domain of 
M that is not an interpretation of some numeral a of standard PA. 
This lacuna is now filled by the Extended Representation meta-Lemma, which ensures 
that the range over which the relation Q(P#*, a*) is well-defined covers the entire 
domain of M, and that Q(P#*, a*) is not satisfied by any value a* in the domain of M 
that is not an interpretation of some numeral a of standard PA.  
This follows immediately since (Ay)(~Q(P#*, y)) in M is now equivalent to: 
"For all y, the formula Y, whose Gödel-number is y, is not the interpretation in M of 
a finite proof sequence in standard PA for the formula (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)), whose 
Gödel-number is P#, from the given set Axm of recursively defined axioms, and the 
given set Inf of recursively defined rules of inference, of standard PA." 
                                                                                                                                            
i.e. F(x, y) cannot be considered to represent f(x) in some respects only, but must be 
taken to represent it entirely. 
 
We argue that Gödel’s interpretation of undecidability actually violates this basic 
integrity. It implies that the truth of some propositions cannot be reflected in the 
formalisation, whilst the undecidability of some formulas cannot be reflected in the 
assertions that they represent. 
 
We argue that this interpretation is subjective, and that a more objective interpretation 
implies that the undecidability of some formulas in standard PA reflects assertions in the 
standard interpretation SI that cannot be ascribed any truth-value, and are thus ill-defined 
assertions similar to the Liar sentence, and not true sentences as concluded by Gödel. 
 
In other words, the sentence ~(Ay)(~Q(P#*, y)) is well-defined in M, and Q(P#*, a*) is 
necessarily false for all values a* in the domain of M that are not interpretations of some 
numeral a of standard PA. 
(The argument here is that the relation Q(x, y) can always be well-defined in every 
interpretation M of standard PA in such a way that it mirrors the “palimpsest” that is 
embedded in the definition of the relation q(x, y) of the standard interpretation SI.)  
We thus argue that there is no interpretation in which the formula ~(Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) of 
standard PA uniquely translates as a well-defined sentence ~(Ay)(~Q(P#*, y)) that can 
be true for some value a* in the domain of M that is not an interpretations of some 
numeral a of standard PA. 
Hence the truth of the sentence ~(Ay)(~Q(P#*, y)) in any interpretation M of standard 
PA can always be defined so as to imply the truth of Q(P#*, n*) for some n* in M, 
where n* is the interpretation of the numeral n in M. 
This, of course, implies the truth of q(P#, n) for some natural number n in the standard 
interpretation SI by the Extended Representation meta-Lemma. This in turn, by Gödel’s 
Self-reference Lemma for q(P#, y), implies that n is a proof of the sentence (Ay)(~Q(P#, 
y)) in standard PA, contradicting the unprovability of the formula (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) in 
standard PA. 
Hence the sentence ~(Ay)(~Q(P#*, y)) can be falsified in every interpretation M of 
standard PA, so that the sentence (Ay)(~Q(P#*, y)) is true in every interpretation M of 
standard PA. 
However, by Gödel’s completeness theorem for first order predicate logic, this again 
implies that the formula (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) is provable in standard PA.  
5.17.  Conclusion 
The contradiction establishes that, if standard PA is consistent, then Gödel’s undecidable 
formulas, (Ay)(~Q(P#, y)) and ~(Ay)(~Q(P#, y)), translate as ill-defined sentences under 
interpretation13. 
Chapter 6.  Conclusions 
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13  The cause of such ill-definedness apparently lies in the formal definition of Q(x, y) as 
the representation of q(x, y) in standard PA through use of the Gödel Beta function. By 
definition, Q(x, y) thus represents, in standard PA, an infinity of “recursive” functions of 
every interpretation (cf. §2.9).  
 
Hence the PA provability of Q(k, m) may be intuitively viewed as corresponding, in any 
interpretation M, to the intuitive assertion that, for any interpretations k* and m* in M 
of the numerals k and m, we can always construct some (non-unique) pair of values u*, 
v* such that we can define a “Beta-function” ß*(u*, v*, i) in M that represents the first 
m* terms, i.e. q'(k*, 0*), q'(k*, 1*), ... , q'(k*, m*), which are common to an infinity of 
“primitive recursive relations” of M, such as q'(x, y), that are formally represented in PA 
by Q(x, y).. 
 
Clearly, in this view, the provability of the formula Q(x, y) for variable x and y does not 
interpret similarly into a unique, well-defined proposition that can be asserted as true in 
M. It follows that the provability of ~Q(x, y) in PA interprets as a true proposition in M 
by virtue of its ill-definedness (i.e. although we may not intuitively assert an ill-defined 
proposition as true in M, we may yet assert that it is not a true proposition in M). 
 
6.1.  The non-constructive nature of Gödel’s first order Arithmetic 
We have argued in §1 and §2 that the non-constructive nature of Gödel’s system of 
standard first order Arithmetic PA admits omega-provable well-formed formulas that 
may translate into propositions that refer to ill-defined totalities (interpreted 
Platonistically) such as those involved in the logical antinomies.  
6.2.  Simply constructive first order systems  
 In §3, we defined various systems of first order Arithmetic in which well-formed 
formulas that may correspond to ill-defined predicates under interpretation cannot be 
strongly represented if the systems are simply consistent. We argued, accordingly, that 
Gödel’s reasoning does not hold in most simply consistent systems of Arithmetic. 
We defined a simply constructive system, omega-PA, of first order Peano’s Arithmetic 
PA, and argued that every model of PA is a model of a simply constructive omega-PA. 
We argued further that omega-PA, unlike PA, admits Cantor’s ordinal-Arithmetic CA as 
a model. 
6.3.  Strongly constructive first order systems 
In §4, we extended the scope of the above argument by defining stronger constructive 
systems, omega1-PA and omega2-PA, of first order Peano’s Arithmetic PA.  
We argued that, even here, well-formed formulas that may correspond to ill-defined 
predicates under interpretation cannot be strongly represented if the system is simply 
consistent, and so again Gödel’s reasoning does not hold. 
However, we have also argued that the axioms, interpretations and models of PA and the 
axioms, interpretations and models of a strongly constructive omega2-PA are identical. 
6.4.  The roots of Gödel’s Platonism 
We thus suggest that Gödel’s Platonism may not have been the result of a faith-only 
belief in an abstract world of absolute mathematical ideals.  
If the arguments of this paper are substantive, then Gödel’s Platonism may have been an 
intuitive reflection of the non-constructive, and implicitly Platonistic, nature of the first 
order predicate calculus chosen by him for defining his formal system of Arithmetic PA. 
6.5.  The conflict within model theory 
We have also highlighted the conflict with classical model theory, and argued that the 
consequences within a model are not Platonistically determined absolutely by the 
interpretation of only the axioms of a formal system in the model, but are consequences 
of the rules of inference that we select for the system. 
6.6.  Consistency 
We conclude with the tentative remarks that, from the above, it can be reasonably argued 
that consistency may not be an inherent feature of an axiomatic system.  
It may, instead, be viewed as a feature of specification that we design into the definition 
of a system through our choice of appropriate rules of inference in order to specify those 
elements of the system, and its interpretations, that reflect what we intend the system to 
communicate faithfully. 
6.7.  Gödel’s undecidable proposition is an ill-defined sentence 
We argue in §5 that Gödel’s undecidable formula GUS, if assumed well-defined under 
interpretation, translates as a true sentence in every interpretation of standard PA. It 
follows that there can be no consistent, non-standard, interpretation in which GUS is 
false. 
Since, by virtue of Gödel’s completeness theorem for a first order predicate calculus, the 
above argument contradicts the essential unprovability of GUS in standard PA, we argue 
further that, if standard PA is assumed simply consistent, then Gödel’s undecidable 
formula GUS translates as an ill-defined sentence that mirrors the Liar sentence in every 
interpretation of standard PA. 
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